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Summary  findings
Khemani studies the effect of state legislative assembly  The empirical results for fiscal policy show that
elections on the policies of state governments in 14  election years have a negative effect on some commodity
major states of India, from 1960 to 1994. She identifies  taxes, a positive effect on investment spending, but no
the effect of the timing of elections using an instrument  effect on deficits, primarily because consumption
for the electoral cycle that distinguishes between  spending is reduced. With regard to public service
constitutionally scheduled elections and midterm polls.  delivery, elections have a positive and large effect on
She contrasts two levers of policy manipulation-fiscal  road construction by state public works departments.
policy and public service delivery-to  distinguish  Strikingly, the fiscal effects are much smaller than the
between alternative models of political cycles. The  effect on roads.
predictions of three models are tested:  Khemani argues that the pattern of evidence is
o  Populist cycles to woo uninformed and myopic  inconsistent with the predictions of models of voter
voters.  myopia and asymmetric information. She explores an
o  Signaling models with asymmetric information.  alternative moral hazard model in which the cycle is
•  A moral hazard model with high discounting by  generated by high political discounting and career
political agents.  concerns persuade politicans to exert greater effort in
election years on the management of public works.
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In political  economy  models  of electoral  competition,  the  traditional  intuition  has
been  that  opportunistic  politicians  will manipulate  economic policy around  election
times  for  political  gain.  The  hypothesized  relationships  between  political  and  eco-
nomic  cycles  have  been  widely  studied  for the  OECD  democracies.'  However,  our
understanding  of the  effect of elections on  economic policy in developing  countries,
where  the  poor and  largely  uneducated  electorate  is more likely to  be susceptible  to
political  manipulation,  is limited  or even non-existent.  In fact,  until  recently  most
developing  countries  did  not have stable  democratic  systems  with  regular  elections,
and  therefore  estimating  the  equilibrium  effect of elections on  economic policy  in a
cross-section  of developing  countries  is  a challenge.  If  an electoral  cycle in  public
policy exists,  the  nature  of political manipulation  and  its contrast  with  cycles in the
OECD  countries,  may  provide  valuable  insight  into  the  issue  of governance  and  ac-
countability,  a topic  of increasing concern to development  policy-makers.  This paper
tests  for the  existence  of electoral  cycles in sub-national  governments  within  a large
developing country with a stable democracy, and  analyzes the motivation  behind  such
cycles.  Specifically, it studies  the  effect of state  legislative assembly elections  on the
policies of state  governments  in 14 major  states  of India,  over the  period  1960-1994.
Since elections occur over specified time intervals, they  are relatively infrequent  events
and  provide  very few observations  to  econometricians  that  study  national  elections
in only one country.  However, analysis at  the  sub-national  level within  one country
provides  analogous  advantages  to  cross-country  studies,  in that  there  are many  more
degrees of freedom.
India  is a  reasonable  place  to  search  for  these  electoral  effects because  it  is  a
'An excellent  summary  of the  literature  is  provided  by  Alesina  et  al  [1997].
1developing  economy with  a  history  of popular  participation  in  democratic  elections
at  various  levels of government.  The  country  established  a system  of universal  adult
suffrage  upon  becoming  a  republic  and  drafting  a  constitution  in  1950.  Since  the
first  elections  in  1952, there  have  been  10 general  elections  for  membership  of the
Lok Sabha,  the  lower house  of Parliament  in New Delhi, and  over 300 state  elections
for  the  Vidhan  Sabhas  or  state  legislative  assemblies,  and  for  district  and  village
councils.  The  average voter  turnout  in general  elections  has been  about  56 per  cent,
and  even greater  in state  elections,  averaging to  more  than  60 per  cent in the  states
in the sample  [Butler,  Lahiri  and  Roy, 1995]. Moreover, there  is substantial  variation
across  the  Indian  states  in  political  and  economic  variables,  over  a  period  of time,
which  is conducive  to  properly  identifying  the  relationship  between  political  cycles
and  economic policies.
There  are  two  distinct  sets  of political  economy models  to  explain  the  economic
effects of elections.2 The  first  is pioneered  by Nordhaus  [1975] and  Lindbeck  [1976],
and  predicts  business  cycles where incumbents  keep growth  high  and  unemployment
low just  before  an  election.  These  opportunistic  policies  at  election  times  lead  to
post-electoral  recessions.  A striking  feature  of these  models  is that  they  require  vot-
ers  to be  especially  myopic  and  uninformed,  because  only  such voters  would  reward
short-term  gains  before elections  that  are reversed just  after  elections.  It  is not  en-
tirely  surprising,  therefore,  that  little  empirical  support  was found  for the  so-called
"political  business  cycles".3 The  second  set  of models  attempt  to  reconcile  rational
2Here,  the  focus  is  on  "opportunistic"  political  models  where  policymakers  maximize  their  probability  of re-
election.  For the US and  OECD countries,  there  are also  "partisan"  models  where different political  parties  represent
the  economic  ideology  of different  constituencies.  Specifically,  left-wing  parties  prefer  to  keep  unemployment  low,
while  right-wing  parties  are  more  concerned  with  inflation  [Hibbs,  1977;  Alesina,  1987].  These  partisan  models
are  not  relevant  in  the  Indian  context,  because  there  are no  clearly  defined  ideological coalitions  based  on specific
combinations  of economic policy.
'McCallum  [1978] and  Golden  and Poterba  [1980] find no significant  evidence  of a political  business  cycle  in US
2expectations  on the  part of voters with  the Nordhaus-Lindbeck  insight  of opportunis-
tic  policy manipulation  by incumbent  politicians.  The  driving  assumption  in  these
"rational  opportunistic"  models of electoral  cycles in public policy is the  existence  of
temporary  information  asymmetries  about  the  incumbent  government's  level of com-
petence.  The  empirical  predictions  of these models  with  regard  to  growth,  inflation,
monetary  and fiscal policy are very different from the traditional  Nordhaus-Lindbeck
models.  Persson  and  Tabellini  [1990] predict  that  competent  incumbents  will follow
pre-electoral  expansionary  policies that  lead  to temporarily  higher inflation,  but  no
post-electoral  recession.  Rogoff and Sibert  [1988)  and  Rogoff [1990)  predict  short-term
political  budget  cycles, where  the incumbent  government  manipulates  fiscal policy to
signal  competency  in  providing  greater  consumption.  In all  these  models,  rational
voters  deduce  the  level of competency,  in equilibrium,  by the  degree of distortion  in
policies.  Moreover, since only competent  politicians  distort  policy in order  to  signal
their  "type"  to  the  voters, the  cycles are predicted  to  occur only occasionally  and  to
be small in magnitude.
The empirical  evidence for the  OECD  countries  is consistent  with the  models  of
political  budget  cycles.  Alesina  et  al  [1997] find  that  in  developed  countries,  fiscal
policy  is relatively  loose in election  years  (with  low taxes  and  high spending),  and
Alesina  and  Roubini  [19921  find that  inflation tends  to increase  after  elections (prob-
ably because  of pre-electoral  expansionary  policies).  However, these  electoral  effects
are  small  and  often  statistically  insignificant.  There  is also limited  evidence of bud-
get  cycles at  the  national  level in the  USA.  Tufte  [1978] finds  evidence for  political
manipulation  of fiscal instruments,  particularly  transfers,  only  in  some presidential
elections.  Besley  and  Case  [1994] examine  economic  policy  effects of gubernatorial
term  limits  in the  US states.  They  find that  "lame  duck"  terms  are systematically
unemployment  and inflation.  Alesina and Roubini  (1992) find no evidence for OECD  economies.
3associated with higher taxes and higher spending, and interpret  it as the result of
lack of effort on the part  of political agents that  no longer care about  re-election.
However,  they report no electoral cycle in taxes and spending within a term in office.
Hence, the widely-held conclusion with regard to election cycles in developed coun-
tries is that  they are small and occur infrequently, and are therefore consistent with
rational-opportunistic stories.
In testing  for the existence of electoral cycles in policy in the Indian states,  a
methodological innovation of this paper is to address the problem of potential endo-
geneity of elections with respect to policy variables. This is especially important  in
the  case of developing countries where the scheduling of elections does not usually
follow a strict,  constitutionally established pattern.  Hence, it is likely that  the tim-
ing of elections is chosen strategically, that is, politicians may call for elections when
economic conditions are particularly favorable.  In addition,  the coefficients  on the
election cycle may be subject to omitted variable bias if some unobservable political
forces lead both to particular policy outcomes and to the occurrence of elections. In
either case, the relation between elections and policy outcomes cannot be interpreted
as the result of political manipulation in view of upcoming elections. Therefore, our
empirical specification employs an instrument for the timing of elections to  ensure
that  it is exogenous to policy choices. This instrument is constructed by distinguish-
ing between constitutionally scheduled elections  and midterm polls that are politically
generated and unanticipated events. 4 Various tests are undertaken to ensure as con-
fidently as possible that  the instrument for the electoral cycle is indeed exogenous to
policy choices.
4 "Midterm"  elections  in  this  case  are  elections  that  take  place  in  the  middle  of  an  incumbent's  constitutionally
established  five year  term.  It  is  not  akin  to  midterm  Congressional  elections  in  the  USA,  that  are  scheduled  and  fully
anticipated  events.
4This  paper  studies  the  effect of state  elections in India  on two separate  policy in-
struments  available to state  governments:  fiscal policies, namely  taxes  and  spending,
and  public  service delivery. 5 We focus on the  provision  of a  specific public  service,
namely  road  construction  by state  public works departments. 6 The inclusion of pub-
lic  services  is unusual  in  this  literature,  which  has  focussed on  fiscal manipulation
to  test  the  predictions  of the  Nordhaus  and  Rogoff models.  However, the  contrast
between  the  effect of elections on  taxes  and  spending  on  the  one hand,  and  public
service delivery  on the  other,  allows us to distinguish  between alternate  theories  ex-
plaining the  existence  of cycles. The Nordhaus-style  model of political  cycles to woo
uninformed  and  myopic voters  predicts  populist  spending  and  tax  cuts  (leading  to
deficits) just  before elections,  followed by post-election  contraction.  The Rogoff model
predicts  tax  cuts,  and increases  in government consumption  spending  at  the expense
of investment  spending.  However, these  distortions  are undertaken  only by capable
incumbents  to signal their  competency in delivering better  service, and  therefore  the
effects are  small  and  are not  expected  to occur  in every election.  A third  model of
career  concerns,  developed in this  paper,  predicts  that  the  effect of elections will be
greatest  on  public  service delivery  as voters  are  able to  extract  greater  effort from
politicians  in  the  election  year.  Fiscal  manipulation,  in  this  interpretation,  may  be
small  and relegated  to selective tax  and spending  categories to extend political  favors
in exchange for campaign  support.
The  results  may  be summarized  as follows: on the  fiscal side,  in the  year  leading
Siince  this  study  focuses  on sub-national  governments,  we do not  expect  macroeconomic  conditions  to  be  amnenable
to  manipulation  before  elections,  as  state  governments  have  no  monetary  authority.  In  fact,  exploratory  regressions
on output  and  inflation  at  the  state  level  showed  no  effect  of the  election  cycle.
6The  state  governments  are  largely  responsible  for  the  following  infrastructures:  road  construction,  electric  power,
irrigation  facilities  and  water  supply.  Ideally,  the  electoral  effect  should  be  estimated  for  all  of these  public  services.
But,  for  this  paper  data  is  only  availahle  on  roads  at  the  state  level  over  a reasonable  period  of  time.
5to  an  election,  incumbent  state  governments  lower taxes,  not  on items  of mass  con-
sumption  but  instead  on a selective  base consisting  of manufacturers  and  producers;
they  increase  spending  on  the  capital  account,  but  reduce  spending  on  the  current
account  which  consists  of various  populist  subsidies  and  salaries.  As a result  of the
reduction  in current  spending,  there  is no  significant  effect  of elections  on  the  state
deficit.  We argue  that  this  pattern  of evidence is contrary  to  both  the  Nordhaus  and
Rogoff type  models.  The electoral  effects on the  composition  of taxes  and  spending  is
not consistent  with  a story  of populist  politics  to woo the  mass of uninformed  voters.
The  distinction  between  capital  and  current  spending  is directly  counter  to Rogoff's
prediction.  The  additional  implications  of the  Rogoff model  for  policies just  after
elections  are also not  upheld  by the  data.
On the  public  service delivery  front,  state  governments  significantly  increase  road
construction  in the  year before elections,  without  corresponding  increases in spending
on roads.  This  election-year  increase  in the  mileage of new roads,  even after control-
ling for  spending  on  roads,  indicates  that  government  management  of public  works
improves  in  election  years.  The  effect  on  roads  is much  larger  in  magnitude  than
the  effect on the  fiscal instruments.  This  is consistent  with  a moral  hazard  model  of
career  concerns  where  politicians  exert  greater  effort  (less shirking)  in the  provision
of public  services  in an  election  year.  The  cycle is generated  by  high  discounting  of
the  future  by  politicians  in  a common  agency  setting  where  they  are  responsive  to
several  different  constituencies.
In summary,  the empirical  evidence for electoral  cycles in India clearly goes against
the  intuition  that  governments  in developing  countries  will employ  populist  tax  and
spending  policies before  elections,  in  order  to  woo  an uninformed  and  myopic  elec-
torate.  The big effect of elections is on public service delivery, which requires  a model
different  from  the  ones in the  received literature  that  focus on  fiscal policy  manipu-
6lation.  There is some evidence for fiscal manoeuvering, but it appears to be limited
to the extension of political patronage to specific groups, in exchange for support for
electioneering.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. The next section outlines the empir-
ical strategy employed to identify the effect of elections on state  economic policies.
Section III describes the data and variables used in the analysis. Section IV presents
the  empirical evidence for the effect of elections on economic policies.  Section V
presents an alternate model of electoral cycles in public policy based on a moral haz-
ard model of politics, where voters are able to extract greater effort from politicians
in election years. Section VI concludes and indicates directions for future research.
II.  The  Empirical  Strategy
The purpose of this paper is to identify the effect of the timing of elections on eco-
nomic policies of state governments. In order to  accomplish this, the electoral cycle
must be exogenous to government policy choices. Exogeneity is a reasonable assump-
tion because the electoral cycle is relatively fixed by constitutional  arrangements.
The first state assembly elections took place in 1952  along with the first general elec-
tions  for the Lok Sabha (India's lower house of Parliament).  Thereafter, elections
were constitutionally scheduled to take place every five years.  However, there have
been several midterm elections for various state legislative assemblies  due to shifting
political alignments. In fact, of the 116 state elections over the period 1960-1994  in
the sample states,  39 elections (i.e. 34 per cent) are midterm elections. This casts
doubt on the identification assumption that  the timing of elections is exogenous to
government policy choices.  The problem is addressed by identifying the  effect of
scheduled elections on economic policy and contrasting that  with the correlation of
7midterm  elections  and  economic  policies.  Scheduled  elections  are  defined  as those
elections  that  occur five years after  the  previous  election,  that  is, following the  con-
stitutionally  established  pattern.  Midterm  elections  are  those  that  occur  one,  two,
three  or four years after  the previous election,  that  is, before the completion  of the five
year  constitutional  term.7 It  is important  to  make  the  distinction  not  only because
midterm  elections  are potentially  endogenous  to policy choices but  also because  their
exact  timing  is generally  sudden  and  unanticipated,  so it  is not  reasonable  to expect
incumbent  governments  to plan  economic  policies to  influence  election  outcomes.
A. The  Basic  Strategy
The strategy  employed to circumvent  the endogeneity  of midterm  elections is to define
an  instrument  for  the  actual  electoral  cycle that  is  plausibly  exogenous  to  policy
choices,  and  correlated  with  the  actual  cycle,  and  then  estimate  the  reduced  form
effect of the  instrument  on  policy  choices.  The  instrumental  electoral  cycle follows
a  five-year  cycle that  begins  anew  after  every  midterm  election.  Election  years  in
the  instrument  coincide exactly  with  scheduled  elections,  but  midterm  elections  are
treated  as one,  two, three  or four years  before a scheduled  election.  The year  after  a
midterm  election is always labelled  as four years before a scheduled  election.  The time-
line of the instrument  is described  pictorially  in Figure  I. This instrument,  henceforth
referred  to as the electoral cycle, is the natural  choice if the timing of midterm  elections
is viewed  as the  result  of a shock  whose effect is limited  to  the  period  of the  shock.
The  frequency  of midterm  elections  in  a  state  could  be  driven  by  some  fixed,
7There  are four  occasions in  the sample  period  where elections  took  place six years  after the  previous  election.  In
the states  of Andhra  Pradesh,  Assam,  Karnataka  and  Maharashtra,  elections took  place in March  1972 and  then  in
February  1978.  This  seems  to  be the  effect of the  Emergency  imposed  by  the  central  government  from  June  1975
to  March  1977.  In these  cases, the  years  1975 (March  31st  1975 to  March  31st  1976) and  1976 (March  31st  1976 to
March  31st  1977) are both  considered  as one year before a scheduled  election.
8unobservable state characteristic, such as its socio-political  make-up that  is invariant
over the sample period. In the sample of 14 states, there are 7 states where only one or
two midterm elections occurred in the period 1960-1994,  4 states where three or four
midterm elections happened, and 3 states (namely Kerala, Punjab and Uttar Pradesh)
which experienced five to six midterm elections. Amongst the high frequency states,
political volatility is a constant feature over the entire sample period; in Kerala owing
to the politics of its communist parties; in Punjab and Uttar Pradesh due to religious
and communal politics [Weiner  and Field, 1974;  Weiner, 1968]. In light of these fixed
state characteristics, the specification to estimate the effect of the instrumental cycle
should control for state-level fixed effects.
The existence of midterm elections in all states of India provides for variation in
the dates of scheduled elections across states, which is necessary to distinguish the
effect of elections from the effect of other shocks in the years in which they take place.
Hence, the effect of elections can be estimated after controlling for year effects. The
resulting empirical model to estimate the effect of the electoral cycle on government
policies is the following:
4
(1)  Y  4+tZEp±. (1  it = ali  + 45t  + E  EiTt,-7  +  Eit
-r=O
where Yit  is an economic  policy choice  of the government of state i in year t; E,r  , for
r = 0, ...4, is a set of  indicator  variables  for the electoral  cycle:  EOt  =  1 if t is a scheduled
election year in state i, Eil,  = 1 if t is one year before a scheduled election in state  i,
and so on. The above specification is also estimated including some observable state
characteristics Xit, including state domestic product (SDP), proportion of agriculture
in  SDP, and  proportion of rural population  as control variables.  These are lagged
four years because both policy variables and state characteristics may be subject to
contemporaneous unobserved shocks. Equation  (1) would therefore be modified as
9follows:
4
(la)  Yit =  04 +  Et +  E  EitO,p  + XitA  + Eit
T=O
where  Xit is a vector  of characteristics  of state  i in year  t - 4.
There  is a  problem  with  this  empirical  strategy  to  identify  the  policy  effects  of
scheduled  elections  if the  shocks  generating  midterm  elections  are in fact  persistent.
Persistence  would imply  that  the  "survivors"  lasting  the whole  term of five years are
systematically  different  from  non-survivors,  in which  case  the  electoral  effect could
simply  be  attributed  to  the  differences  in  policies  adopted  by  survivors  and  non-
survivors.  This  necessitates  further  scrutiny  of the  determinants  of midterm  state
elections  in India,  and  empirical  tests  to rule out the  confounding  effect of persistent
shocks.
B.  Causes  of Midterm  Elections
The direct  cause  of a midterm  election  is either  shifting  alignments  within  the ruling
party,  breakdown  of  coalition  governments,  or  partisan  pressure  from  the  federal
government.  In  order  to  enjoy majority  power  in the  state  assembly,  a  party  needs
to  win two-thirds  of the  total  seats  in the  assembly.  In  the  sample,  the  number  of
midterm  elections  with  coalitions  is about  equal  to  the  number  of elections  where
parties  control  the  majority  of the  seats.  This  implies  that  midterm  elections  in the
Indian  states  are not  primarily  driven  by the  collapse  of tenuous  coalitions.
The  most  remarkable  feature  of  the  midterm  elections  is the  following.  Of  all
the  midterm  elections  an  overwhelming  85  per  cent  have  incumbents  that  are  not
affiliated  with  the  party  governing  at  the  center.  In  contrast,  only  25 per  cent  of
scheduled  elections  have incumbents  that  are not  affiliated  with  the  center.  This,  of
course,  indicates  that  political  volatility  leading  to  mid-term  polls  is more  likely in
10states  and  in  years when  the  dominant  parties  are  not  aligned  with  the  centre.  In
view of the  traditional  dominance  of a  single party  at  the  center,  and  the  fact  that
the Indian federation  is very centralized,  it is quite likely that  state midterm  elections
are fuelled by pressures from the central  government.  In fact, under  Article  356 of the
Constitution  of India, the  central  government  has the  authority  to recommend  that  a
state  government  be removed, irrespective  of whether it controls majority  seats in the
assembly, and  Presidential  Rule be imposed on the  state  if  "a situation  has arisen  in
which the government  of the state cannot  be carried on in accordance with the consti-
tution"  [Hardgrave,  1980, p.  58]. Typically,  Presidential  Rule  lasts for a few months
and  is followed by midterm  elections.  About  45 per  cent  of the  midterm  elections in
the  sample followed the imposition  of Presidential  Rule  in the  state.  Many political
studies  document  that  the imposition  of Presidential  Rule is driven by strikingly  par-
tisan  motives.8 Political  affiliation  certainly  qualifies as  a  "persistent  shock",  since
the  electoral  cycle could be the  result  of comparing  systematically  different  policies
adopted  by aligned and  non-aligned  states,  and  not the  result  of strategic  manipula-
tion  by govermnents  facing elections.  It  is highly likely, in the  Indian  context,  that
the effect of political  affiliation is accounted for simply through  the state  fixed effects,
since  "pro-center"  or  "anti-center"  attitudes  are relatively  constant  across  the  years
in individual  states,  irrespective  of the  party  currently  controlling  the legislative  as-
sembly. However, to test for the effect of political affiliation in a more general manner,
we estimate  the  following model:
4  4
(2)  Yit  = ai + 6t +E  [E  Et * AFFit]1T +  E  [Eilt  * [1-AFFit]]6,  + AFFity +  sit
T=0  T=O
where AFFit is an indicator of political affiliation that  equals 1 when the incumbent
in state  i at  time  t is aligned with  the  party  in power at  the  center  at  time  t,  and  0
8 See  Hardgrave  [1980],  Dua[1979],  and  Maheshwari  [1977].
11otherwise. Therefore, Eirt  *  AFFit  represents the electoral cycle where the incumbent is
affiliated and Eirt  * [1  - AFFit]  represents the cycle where the incumbent is not affiliated
with  the  central party.  The equality of the coefficients 0,  and  0, indicates that
state electoral effects are independent of party affiliation. We also test that  political
affiliation does not  confound electoral effects by estimating equation  (1) and  (la)
separately for states with AFFit = 0, and states with AFFit  = 1. If an electoral cycle
is found in both  subsamples, then the story of strategic manipulation of economic
policy to affect political outcomes is viable. However,  the cycles could be different for
the aligned and non-aligned samples if the two types of governments follow different
political strategies. 9
The effect of persistent unobservable shocks is tested by isolating the policy effects
of those election cycles that  do not follow midterm elections. An indicator variable
that equals 1 if the previous election was a midterm election is included by itself and
interacted with the electoral cycle. The specification is modified to:
4  4
(3)  Yit  = ai + Et +  E  [EiTt  * Dit]O,r  + E  [Eir,  * [I -Dit]]0r  + Dity  + Eit
-,  =O  r=O
where Dit is an indicator variable which equals 1 if the previous election was a
midterm election and 0 if the previous election was a scheduled election.  Ei 2t * Dit
represents the electoral cycle that midterm elections and Eit * [1  - Dit] represents the
electoral cycle that  follows  scheduled elections. The test of the equality of the coeffi-
cients /T  and 0, is the test that the midterm election shocks are not persistent, that
is, the instrument identifies the effect of the electoral cycle on economic  policies.
National elections could be viewed as temporary shocks that determine the timing
of midterm elections.  In fact, some midterm elections that  occurred only one year
9Affiliation with the central government could influence economic  policies  of state governments via intergovern-
mental grants and the sharing of taxes collected  by the center and distributed to the states. A complementary  study
[Khemani, 1999]  finds that grants-in-aid  and share in central taxes are unaffected  by state elections.
12before the  regular schedule  coincide exactly  with  national  elections to avoid duplicat-
ing the  costs  of electioneering  by  waiting  to  hold  state  elections  in the  immediately
following year.  In  general,  in politically  volatile  situations,  cost  considerations  lead
the  Election  Commission  to coordinate  the  timing  of midterm  elections  with  that  of
national  elections.  In total,  56  per  cent  of state  midterm  elections  coincided  with
general elections.  To test  the  hypothesis  that  state  economic policies respond  to state
elections and not to national  elections, the same strategy  described  above is employed,
that  is, testing  the  equality  of the  election  year coefficient when it coincides  and  does
not coincide with  a national  election.
C.  An  Alternate  Instrument  for  the  Electoral  Cycle
An  alternate  instrument  could  also be employed to  test  for the  effect  of elections  on
economic  policies.' 0 This  instrument  treats  the  fifth  year  after every election,  that  is
after both  midterm  and  scheduled  elections,  as a scheduled  election  year, irrespective
of whether  an election  actually  occurred  or not.  Some elections in this  instrument  co-
incide exactly  with  actual  scheduled  elections,  but  there  are many  additional  election
years.  In fact,  this  instrument  has  115 scheduled  elections  of which  only 77 coincide
with  actual  scheduled  elections  in  the  sample  period.  The  advantage  of this  instru-
ment  relative  to  the  previous  one  described  in Figure  1 is that  it  is more  likely to
be exogenous  to  economic  policies,  since it gives precedence  to  events  that  occurred
further  back  in  time  and  are  therefore  less  likely  to  have  persistent  effects.  The
drawback,  however, is that  it is less correlated  with  the  actual  cycle,  leading  to  the
standard  problem  of weakly correlated  instruments.  This  alternate  instrument  is used
in  all  specifications  to  conduct  a Hausman  test  of the  exogeneity  of the  instrument
described  in Figure  1.
101  am  grateful  to  Michael  Kremer  for  first  suggesting  this  alternate  instrument.
13III.  The  Data
The data  set  for this  study  is compiled from diverse sources for 14 major states
of India  over  the  period  1960-1994.11 The  political  data  on  elections  is taken  from
Butler,  Lahiri and  Roy [1995]. The public finance data  on taxes and expenditure
is available from the  1960-1994 volumes of the  Reserve Bank of India Bulletin, a
quarterly publication of the central bank of India with annual issues on the finances
of state  governments 12. Highways and roads data  is compiled from the  1961-1995
volumes of the Basic Roads Statistics, an annual publication of the Ministry of Surface
ransport  of India and from various state Statistical Abstracts 13. State demographic
and  economic characteristics, and  a state-level price index to convert all variables
into real terms, are available from an Indian data  set put  together  at the Poverty
and Human Resources Division, Development  Research Group of the World Bank. A
detailed description of these variables is available in Ozler et al. [1996].
"  l The States  Reorganization  Act of 1956 divided the Indian federation  into 14 states  and 5 union territories  that  were
administered  by the  Central  government.  In  1960, the  state  of Bombay  was divided  into  Gujarat  and Maharashtra.
In 1966, the  PEPSU  (Patiala  and E. Punjab  States  Union) was divided  into  its two main  constituents,  Haryana  and
Punjab.  This  study  includes  13 states  that  were already  established  in 1960, namely Andhra  Pradesh,  Assam, Bihar,
Gujarat,  Karnataka,  Kerala,  Madhya  Pradesh,  Maharashtra,  Orissa, Rajasthan,  Tamil Nadu,  Uttar  Pradesh  and West
Bengal.  The fourteenth  state  in 1960, Jammu  and Kashmir,  has been excluded  because of the political  uncertainties  in
the region that  continue  to  this day. The state  of Punjab  is included after  1966, when it attained  separate  statehood.
Haryana  is not  included  because  data  for this  state  is  not  available across  many explanatory  variables.
Currently,  India  has 25 states  because  several  union  territories  have  attained  statehood  over the  years,  the  most
recent  converts  occurring  as recently  as  1991.  Therefore,  to  maintain  consistency  in  our  analysis  over  a reasonable
time  period,  we only  include those  states  that  existed since 1960 and  1966.
121 am grateful  to  Tim  Besley of the  London School of Economics for providing  me with  some of this data  that  had
already  been  compiled  in his research  group.
13Data  on state  roads  was taken  from a district-level  data  set  put  together  by Robert  Evenson at  Yale  University
using  official Government  of India sources.  Evenson,  Pray and  Rosegrant  [1994| provide a detailed  description  of this
data  set.
14The following is a description  of the policy instruments  included  in this  analysis.
Fiscal  Variables:  State  tax  revenues  axe from  agricultural  income  tax,  taxes  on
property  and  capital  transactions,  and  taxes  on  commodities  and  services" 4. Com-
modity  tax  revenues  are  by  far  the  most  important  source  of revenue  for  states,
accounting  for about  60 percent  of total  taxes  (including share in federal  taxes),  and
88 percent  of a  state's  own tax  revenues.  The chief components  of commodity  tax
revenues are  state  sales taxes  (accounting  for about  50 percent  of total  commodity
taxes),  producer  taxes  on inter-state  trade  of goods  (accounting  for 10 percent),  and
state  excise duties  on the  production  of alcoholic liquors, opium,  and  other  narcotics
(accounting  for 15 percent).
The  expenditure  of state  governments  on  the  current  account  is categorized
into  development  and  non-development  expenditure.  Development  expenditure  in-
cludes recurrent  expenditure  on the maintenance  of social and  economic services, in-
cluding large  agricultural  subsidies.  Non-development  expenditure  consists  of spend-
ing on administrative  and fiscal services, including compensation  to government  em-
ployees.  Total  spending  on  the  current  account  is about  70  percent  of total  state
government  expenditure.  Development  spending  on  the  capital  account  consists  of
investment  spending  for the  creation  of assets,  again  under  the  separate  categories
of social  services  and  economic  services.  Development  capital  spending  is only  12
percent  of total  expenditure.  Table  I summarizes  the  above discussion  of state  fiscal
variables.
Road  Network:  The  two main  categories  of roads  in India  are  national  highways
and  state  roads.  Funds  for the  development  of national  highways  are  provided  by
central  government  budgets  on an  annual  basis,  but  the  management  is undertaken
14State governments  in India do not collect  personal  income taxes.  These  are imposed  and collected by the central
government  and  the proceeds are shared with  the  states.
15by state  Public Works  Departments  (PWDs).  Though  national  highways constitute
only  about  2 per  cent of the  total  road  network,  they  carry  40 per  cent  of the  total
road  traffic  [Infrastructure  in India,  CMIE,  1998]. Funds  for state  roads  (consisting
of state  highways and  district  and  village roads)  come from the  respective  state  gov-
ernrnent  budgets.  State  highways are  also managed  by PVVDs and  carry  about  30
per  cent  of the  total  traffic  [CMIE,  1998].  The  management  of district  and  village
roads  is sometimes  decentralized  to local governing bodies within  the  state.  Table II
summarizes  the  sources of funding  and management  of different roads  in India.
Data  for  this  analysis  is available  for  national  highways and  for  total  state
roads,  that  is, state  highways,  district  and  village roads.  Data  on national  highways
is taken  from  the  Basic Roads  Statistics  of India.  There  are several  missing values
because  states  fail to  regularly  update  the  information  with  the  Ministry  of Surface
Transport.  In addition,  the  publication  of roads  statistics  was very  irregular  in  the
decade  of the  1970s. Most of the missing values belong to that  period.  Data  on state
roads  is available for 12 states"5 and  only upto  1987.
Table III  presents  means and standard  deviations  of the  variables.  Because  of the
diversity  of sources,  the  time  period  covered varies  across variables,  so the  number
of observations  is different  for different  variables.  The  empirical  analysis  tests  the
robustness  of the evidence in the face of changing samples when variables  are excluded
or included  in the  analysis.
IV.  Empirical  Evidence
A. Effect of elections  on tax revenues
The  analysis  of the  effect  of elections  on  taxes  begins  with  a  simple  specification
'
5The  excluded  states  are Assain and Kerala.  Data  is available compositely  for the states  of Punjab  and Haryana.
16estimating  the  effect of the  election  year  indicator  variable  on total  commodity  tax
revenues collected by  state  governments.  Table IV(a)  reports  the  separate  regression
results  for  scheduled  and  midterm  election  year  indicators.  Without  controlling  for
any  state  characteristics,  commodity  taxes  fall  by  about  Rs.  3.5  per  capita  in  a
scheduled  election  year,  but  increase  by  almost  Rs.  5 in  a midterm  poll.  However,
the coefficients are not statistically  significant.  When controls for state  characteristics
such  as  state  income,  share  of agriculture  and  proportion  of rural  population  are
included,  the point  estimate  of the coefficient on scheduled  elections does not change
much, but  it  is now significant  below the  5 per  cent level.  The contrast  in the  effect
of scheduled  and midterm  elections confirms the need to  distinguish  between  the two
in order to identify  a causal effect of elections on taxes.  Predictably,  when states  are
richer  and  have  a larger  urban  and  manufacturing  sector,  commodity  tax  revenues
are higher.
The  two columns of Table  IV(b)  present  regression estimates  of equations  (1) and
(la)  to determine  the  effect of the whole election cycle on commodity  taxes, using the
instrument  defined in Section III.  Commodity taxes  are significantly  lower in election
years compared  to  other  years in  the  cycle.  Figure  Ila  plots  the  coefficients on  the
election cycle (with the election year coefficient set equal to 0).  It  indicates that  taxes
are lower as the time  of election comes closer.  Commodity  taxes  in election  years are
about  Rs 3.5 lower per capita  than  the  average of the other four years.  This reduction
is about  6 per  cent of the  average per  capita  commodity  tax  revenues in the  sample
states.
Equations  (2) and  (3) were estimated  to  test  whether  the  electoral  cycle in taxes
presented  in Tables IV(a)  and IV(b)  are properly identified.  Including  political affilia-
tion  and controlling for years following midterm  elections does not affect the electoral
cycle in taxes.  There  is also no difference in the effect of elections that  are coincident
17and not coincident with general elections. The alternate instrument for the timing of
elections does not yield significant  results. However,  the Hausman test indicates that
it is consistent with the results of the reported instrument.
There is no significant effect of the electoral cycle on non-tax revenues, such as
revenues from interest  receipts, dividends and profits, general services, and social,
economic  and fiscal services. There is also no evidence of an electoral cycle in property
taxes. This lack of evidence  further supports the hypothesis that  commodity tax cuts
are driven by political motives rather than by some unobservable shocks that  affect
all variables, since it is difficult to explain why these shocks only affect commodity
taxes and not property taxes and interests and dividends.
State  sales tax on items of mass consumption is by far the largest contributing
component of the category of commodity taxes, and given the regressive nature  of
these taxes, it would be natural  to assume that  the fall in taxes is driven by rate-
cuts on products that  are widely consumed by low and middle income groups. But,
an  analysis of the effect of elections on the  composition of commodity taxes tells
a different story-  there is no significant effect of elections on state  sales tax,  but
producer taxes on inter-state trade of goods, and state excise  duties on the production
of alcoholic liquors, opium, and other narcotics, fall significantly  in election years. The
results are reported in Table IV(c).  After state  sales tax, these producer taxes are
the main source of state commodity tax revenue.
The tax base for inter-state trade of goods and excise duty on alcohol is, by def-
inition,  narrow.  The  election-year effects on these categories are substantial:  tax
collected from the inter-state trade of goods falls by Rel  per capita, which is 18 per
cent of the average per capita trade  tax collection; excise tax collections fall by Rs
1.4 per  capita, which is 15 per cent of the average per capita excise in the sample.
This implies substantial tax breaks for a small group of the population, a result that
18inmnediately points  towards  a story  of political  purchase  of campaign  support.' 6
If these tax  cuts  are the result  of signalling by competent  governments,  then  Rogoff
[1990] predicts  that  taxes  should  be lower on  average also  in  the  year  immediately
following  elections.  However, the  coefficients on  the  non-election  years  of the  cycle
are statistically  indistinguishable  from each other.
B.  Effect  of  elections  on  expenditure
Table  V(a)  reports  the  effect  of scheduled  and  midterm  election  years  on  capital
outlays  for  asset  creation.  Capital  spending  increases  in  a scheduled  election  year,
but  falls  in  a  midterm  election.  Spending  increases  by  about  Rs  2.5 in  scheduled
election  years,  although  the  coefficient is only significant  at  the  10 per  cent level. On
the  other  hand,  capital  spending  falls significantly  in midterm  elections.
Table  V(b)  presents  the  electoral  cycle in capital  spending.  Figure  IIb  plots  the
coefficients on the different  years of the  electoral  cycle, while constraining  the election
cycle coefficient  to  equal  0.  The  four  coefficients on  the  lags of the  electoral  cycle,
reported  in column  (2), are statistically  indistinguishable  from each other.  Again,  the
prediction  of a  Rogoff-style signalling  model  that  spending  should  be relatively  high
just  after elections is not satisfied.  Capital  spending  in the  election year increases by 9
per cent of the average spending  in the states  in the sample period.  The electoral  cycle
in  capital  spending  is unaffected  by  the  political  affiliation  of incumbents  and  holds
even after  the  incidence  of a midterm  election.  Employing  the  alternate  instrument
to test  the effect  of elections  on capital  spending  yields the  same conclusions.
'6An excise tax  cut  on alcohol could  be interpreted  as a  "populist"  measure.  How-
ever,  it  may  be  argued  that  it  is still  too  selective  a  tax  break  (given  that  general
sales taxes  are  unaffected)  to fit a story  of widespread  voter  myopia  that  encourages
short-term  spending  sprees before elections.
19The scheduled  election  year  has  a  negative effect on  spending  on the  current  ac-
count,  but  the effect is significant only when other  state  characteristics  are included.
The results  are reported  in Table  V(c).  The point  estimate,  with  state  controls,  in-
dicates  that  current  spending  falls by  about  Rs  5 per  capita,  which  is almost  3 per
cent of the average level in the sample.  Therefore, it appears  that  the composition  of
spending changes in elections, in favor of spending on the capital  account.  In contrast,
Columns  (3) and  (4) of Table  V(c) show that  midterm  elections  are associated  with
higher spending  on the current  account,  and as mentioned  earlier,  lower spending  on
the  capital  account.
The  election-year  fall in  current  account  spending  is somewhat  counter-intuitive
because this  is the category which includes various subsidies (on food and agricultural
inputs),  and  salaries  to  civil servants  and  government  employees.  Hence, if electoral
cycles are  driven  by voter  myopia,  this  is the  type  of spending  which  would  be ex-
pected  to  increase.  In  fact,  a  separate  regression  on  food  subsidies  shows  that  it
actually  falls significantly  in election years.1 7 Capital  spending,  on the  other  hand,  is
widely  regarded  as a  more convenient  tool  for political  patronage  of specific groups
or individuals,  since new construction  contracts  can be given selectively.
Why  does spending  not  increase  across  the  board  in a  scheduled  election  year?
In order  for  that  to  happen,  the  budget  constraint  would  require  that  government
receipts  increase  in order  to fund the  rising expenditure.  Since elections are  accom-
panied  by tax  cuts,  one source for increasing  state  funds are  capital  receipts,  which
could imply  an increase in the  budget  deficit.  Such a strategy  is predicted  by Rogoff
and  Sibert  [1988]. However, in  the  Indian  political  budget  cycle,  current  spending
"
7The  negative  coefficient  on  the  election  year  for  food  subsidies  is  not  because  they  are  higher  immiediately  after
elections,  that  is,  due  to  an  election-year  promise  to  increase  subsidies  after  being  elected  to  power.  The  results  are
available  from  the  author  upon  request.
20tends to decrease while the budget deficit is unaffected. The next section describes
the effect on the state budget deficit.
C. Electoral  policy  manipulation  and budget  deficits
Table VI reports the effect of elections on the growth of public debt held by the state
govermnent, consisting of market borrowings and loans from the central government.
The point estimate indicates that  state  debt increases in the election year, but  it
is not statistically significant. The 95 percent confidence  interval indicates that  the
election year effect on state debt could range between an increase of Rs 8 or a fall of
Rs 3 per capita.  Therefore, it is clear that  state elections do not have a significant
and systematic effect on the budget deficit." 8
The reduction in taxes and increase in capital spending in election years appears
to be financed largely by reductions in current spending. The 95 percent confidence
interval on current spending (when the point estimate is not statistically significant)
indicates that  spending in the election year, in comparison to other years, ranges
between a fall of Rs 9.5 per capita and a rise of Rs 2 per capita.
D.  Correlation  with midterm  elections
It is striking to note that  if a significant correlation of midterIn elections with the
policy variables exists, then it is exactly opposite in sign to the effect of scheduled
[8The  lack of effect of elections  on state debt in India may not be surprising because
there are legal restrictions on state governments' access to credit markets. However,
states have often resorted to unauthorized overdrafts with the central bank, that  are
eventually transformed to loans from the central government. Therefore, the finding
here may still reflect the outcome of active choices by state governments, since states
have had the ability to stretch the rules associated with borrowing from the central
government.
21elections on economic  policies. This highlights the importance of predicating models
of electoral cycles on exogenous  timing of elections. Midterm elections are associated
with significantly higher taxes, lower capital spending, and higher current spending.
This correlation cannot be interpreted as a causal relation since rnidterm elections
are potentially endogenous to policy choices.
The correlation between midterm elections and  fiscal policy could be driven by
some unobserved variable, which could be interpreted as political volatility, that  af-
fects both policy variables and the incidence of a midterm election. In this interpre-
tation, greater instability may lead to higher taxes, and higher current spending, but
lower outlays for asset creation, perhaps because politically weak governments are
unable to maintain fiscal discipline. The budgetary procedures for passing a current
versus a capital spending bill are no different. Hence, it is not clear why weak gov-
ernments are able to increase current spending but actually reduce capital spending.
On the other hand, the correlation could be driven by particularly unpopular policies,
that get reflected in high taxes and lower  investment spending, and lead to the calling
of a midterm election.
E.  Effect of elections  on roads
The effect of elections  on roads is reported in Table VII. The first two columns present
the effect of elections on national highways, and the next three columns report the
equations for state roads. The coefficients  on the electoral cycle for roads are presented
in Figure III.
National Highways: The election year has a significant positive effect on the com-
pletion of new roads in the network of national highways in a state.  Including only
the indicator variable for the election year adequately captures the  cycle because
the null hypothesis of equality between the coefficients  on the lag years cannot be re-
22jected.  The electoral cycle in national  highways is unaffected by the indicator  variable
for years  following midterm  elections.  The  effect of political  affiliation  is considered
below.
The length  of new roads  added to national  highways increases by about  47 kilome-
ters  (or 29 miles)  in an election year.  This figure is one and  a half times  the  average
length of new roads added in a year to the national  highways network  of states.  This is
a remarkably  large effect, and therefore  surprising,  since it's  unclear how governments
are able to  manipulate  a long-term  investment  project  such as road  construction.  It
is highly possible  that  the  significant  jump  in highways in an election  year  need  not
be due  to  projects  started  and  completed  within  the  span  of the  election  yeax.  The
election  year effect could be driven by the rapid completion  of existing projects  in the
face of imminent  elections.  If that  is the case, then  elections  could be interpreted  as
enhancing  the efficiency of government  management.
On the other  hand,  the government  could be pumping  money for "ribbon-cutting"
publicity,  to  start  and  finish new projects  within  an election  year.  As noted  earlier,
the funds  for the  development  of national  highways are provided by the  central  gov-
ernment,  but  the  actual  construction  and  management  is undertaken  by  the  state
PWDs.  Data  on central  government  financing of roads  is not available for this  study,
so it is not possible to control for the actual  spending  on national  highways.  However,
if the  electoral  surge  in the  length  of new national  highways is driven by  increasing
transfer  of funds from the centre  to the states,  then  the electoral effect should only be
relevant  for those  states  where the  incumbents  are  politically  aligned with  the  party
in power  at  the  center.  It  would  be unreasonable  to expect  the  central  government
to increase  the  supply of funds to non-affiliated  incumbents  in a critical  election  year.
Hence,  in the context  of national  highways, testing  for the effect of political  affiliation
becomes  a test  of the effect of elections after controlling  for spending  on roads.  If the
23increase in highway construction is not driven by sudden increases in funds, then the
electoral effect should be identical across affiliated and non-affiliated states, since all
the financing for national highways is undertaken by central governments.
In Table VII(a), equation (2) is estimated for national highways. We are unable
to reject the equality of the coefficients  on the election cycle when the incumbent is
aligned and when not-aligned with the center.  Recalling that  the data  on national
highways suffers from several missing values, the robustness of the election result
is tested  against any sample selection bias.  The electoral cycle is estimated sepa-
rately for the two samples where the state government is affiliated and not  affiliated
with the center.  The positive effect of elections on national highways holds in both
samples, but now only at the 10 per cent level of significance  for affiliated states and
insignificantly  for non-affiliated  states. This statistical discrepancy is probably driven
by the substantially fewer observations on national highways  in non-affiliated states.
Thus, both affiliated and non-affiliated state governments increase road construction
on national highways in an election year. The election year coefficient  is smaller for
the sample of non-affiliated states, a result that  is consistent with the negative co-
efficient on the affiliation indicator in Table VIIa: non-affiliated states tend to have
lower mileage of national highways than affiliated states in all years, irrespective of
the electoral cycle.
The evidence shows that  even though funds for national highways are controlled
by central governments, incumbents in state  governments are able to  manipulate
the management of state PWDs to influence  road construction in an election year." 9
tISome  anecdotal evidence on this issue might be helpful at this point. I discussed
the possibility and nature of an electoral effect on national highways with a senior
engineer in the PWD Roads Department of the Government of West Bengal. In his
view, the length of new roads is greater in an election year because of the pressure
exerted by ministers of state to complete existing projects rapidly. He claimed that
24The  equations  for  national  highways are  also estimated  after  controlling  for  state
budgetary  spending  on roads,  despite  the  official rule that  state  budgets  do  not con-
tribute  to  national  highways.  As expected,  the coefficient  on state  road  spending  is
insignificant.
State  Roads:  Columns  (3) through  (5) of Table  VII present  the  estimates  for the
electoral  cycle in state  roads.  The electoral  cycle in state  roads  (state  highways and
district  and  village roads)  is not as significant  as in national  highways.  Election  year
road  construction  in state  roads  is significantly  greater  than  four years and  two years
before elections,  but  no different  from road  construction  one and  three  years  before
elections.  The  size  of the  effect  is rather  large.  New  state  roads  increase  by  925
kilometers  (or 575 miles) compared  to the  average of other  years,  which is 56 per  cent
of the  average  annual  growth  in state  roads.  Perhaps  the  statistical  insignificance  is
due  to  the  fact  that  the  dependent  variable  lumps  together  different  types  of roads
with  different  strategic  values.  Elections  may  only be affecting state  highways,  so the
effect is confounded  by the  "noise" added  through  district  and  village roads.
Data  on  spending  on  roads  and  bridges  in state  government  budgets  is available
since 1972, hence it is possible to control  for state  spending  on roads  in the  equation
for  the  construction  of new state  roads.  But,  since the  data  on  state  roads  is only
available  upto  1987, including  roads  expenditure  reduces  the  sample  size by  40  per
cent.  The  regression results  are reported  in column  (5) of Table VII.  Expenditure  on
roads  has  a positive  coefficient but  is not  statistically  significant.  Road  construction
in the  election  year  is higher  than  construction  in  the  next  year  only at  the  10 per
cent level of significance.  The lack of significance could be as much due to the  loss of
observations  as due  to  the inclusion  of the  spending  variable.
since  road  development  plans  are  very  long-term  plans,  sudden  injections  of extra
funds to  build  significantly  more roads  in an election year  did not seem feasible.
25A separate  regression of state  spending on roads and bridges finds that  the estimate
of the  effect of elections on spending  is highly insignificant.  Putting  together  the  two
pictures  of increases  in road construction  without  corresponding  increases in spending
could suggest  that  the election year effect is driven by greater  efficiency in government
management.20
Electoral  effect on  state  roads  for  big versus  small  states:  This  section  explores
whether  the  electoral  effect on roads  is different  across  big and  small states,  as mea-
sured  by  the  geographic  area  of the  states.  The underlying  assumption  is that  the
internal  state  roads  network  has greater  importance  for bigger states  in order  to link
all centers of commercial significance within  its boundaries,  with  each other  and  with
the  national  highways.  On  the  other  hand,  national  highways  are  relatively  more
important  for smaller states  because  they  may suffice to link major  nodes of commu-
nication  within  the  state.
The  five states  with  the  largest  area  are,  in order,  Madhya  Pradesh,  Rajasthan,
Maharashtra,  Uttar  Pradesh,  and  Andhra  Pradesh.  An indicator  variable is employed
for state  size equalling  1 for the five largest states  and 0 for the remaining  nine smaller
states.  Table VIII  reports  the results  for the differential  electoral  effect on state  roads
for the  big  versus  the  smaller  states.  The  results  show that  state  roads  increase
significantly  and  substantially  in  election  years  for  the  big  states.  The  difference
between  the  electoral  effect for big and  small states  is significant  at  the  10 per  cent
level
20A  concern  is  often  raised  that  governments  over-invest  in  new  construction  at
the  expense  of maintaining  existing  assets.  Therefore,  it  could  be that  in  election
years funds  are diverted  from road  maintenance  to new road  construction.  However,
regressions  on  disaggregated  data  on  current  and  capital  spending  on  roads  did not
show a negative  effect of elections on maintenance  spending.
26F.  Interaction  of Electoral  Effect with Local Conditions
The  size of the  electoral  cycle may  vary  with  certain  local  conditions,  such  as edu-
cation,  income inequality,  or poverty  amongst  voters.  If the  cycle is driven  by voter
myopia,  we  may  expect  larger  election-year  effects when  there  is greater  illiteracy,
inequality,  or poverty  in  the  population.  However,  the  interaction  of the  electoral
effect with  these  local conditions  was never significant.
We also tested  whether  the  cycle was different  in states  that  have more  stagnant
economies,  and  poorer  human  conditions,  as measured  by education,  caste  violence,
position  of women etcetera.  Again,  no evidence was found  for a significant  difference.
There  is also  no  difference  between  northern  and  southern  states,  and  between  big
and  small  states  (except  with  regard  to the  cycle in roads).
V.  Moral  Hazard  and  Career  Concerns:  An  alternate  model
for electoral  cycles
This section develops a theoretical  framework that  could explain the  empirical  results
described  above.  First,  the  shortcomings  of existing  models  of electoral  cycles  in
explaining  the  Indian  cycle are summarized.  Then,  a moral  hazard  model  of career
concerns,  with  high  political  uncertainty,  is presented  as an alternative  explanation
for the  empirical  evidence.
The  evidence  is contrary  to  the  predictions  of both  a  Nordhaus-style  model  of
myopic voters  and the Rogoff-style model of signalling under  asymmetric  information.
First,  the  effect  of elections on the  composition  of state  government  spending  is the
opposite  of that  predicted  by  both  models.  In the  Indian  states,  capital  spending
increases  and  consumption  spending  decreases in an election  year.2'  Therefore,  there
2'This  difference could  still be reconciled  by making  different assumptions  about  visibility and voter  preferences.
27is no evidence for a political spending spree that  increases state deficits. Second, the
election effect on taxes is restricted to a very particular subset, and does not appear
to be a policy manipulation intended to benefit the mass of the voters.  Third, the
effect of elections on road construction is very large, and exists even after controlling
for spending. It does not seem reasonable that short-term competency shocks should
generate such substantial  cycles in public service delivery.
This paper argues that the policy cycle in the Indian states seems most consistent
with moral hazard models of common agency, which recognize that  politicians have
obligations towards several groups of conflicting interests.  One implication is that
politicians develop a short time horizon because of the political uncertainty associated
with special interest politics.  This idea is particularly relevant for a parliamentary
system of government, such as that  which exists in the Indian states.  The primary
architects of state government policy are the chief ministers, who are leaders of the
majority party in the state legislature. These leaders face the risk of losing control
over the party, and be replaced by other individuals, even in the middle of the party's
elected term in office. In fact, in 60 percent of the five-year  terms in the Indian sample,
the chief minister of a state changed (sometimes more than once) during the majority
party's term in office. Manor [1995]  describes the extraordinary political pressures on
Indian chief ministers to retain control over their party, because of constant political
intrigue between different constituencies. If a politician associates each period with an
exogenous probability p of losing power, then the effective  discount rate is 6 = 0*  [1  -p],
where 3 is a standard discount parameter that may be close to one, but [1- p]  may be
very small if losing political control of the party is highly probable. The interpretation
is that  politicians spend the first periods in office  working towards cementing their
control over the party and their support from influential groups, and enact policies
to woo voters only when elections are around the  corner and reelection is actually
28meaningful  to them.
If the future  is highly discounted  by politicians,  then  a career  concerns model  along
the lines developed by Holmstrom  [1982]  yields a short  term electoral  cycle in economic
policy.  The basic model may  be outlined  as follows. There  are three  periods,  the pre-
election  period,  the  election  period  and  the  post  election  period.  After  observing
output  in the  first  two periods,  the  electorate  votes at  the  end  of period  2.  In period
3, the  output  is consumed  and  the  world  ends.  Risk  neutral  voters  care  about  the
output  or performance  variable  that  is denoted  by Yt,  and  depends  on the  incumbent
politician's  ability  0 (time  invariant)  and  her  effort et.  The  production  technology  is
linear  and  stochastic,  given by:
Yt  =  0 +  et  +  Et
where  the  Et are  drawn  independently  from  a  normal  distribution  with  mean  0
and  variance  ,2..  Both  politicians  and  voters  are uncertain  about  the  value of 0, but
have beliefs about  its distribution  in the  population.  In particular,  at  the  beginning
of period  1, 9  is assumed  to be  distributed  normally  with  mean  m1 and  variance  af.
While  output  is observable,  effort and  the  stochastic  term  are not.
The  politician  is also  assumed  to  be  risk neutral.  The politician  gets  some fixed
rents  x in  every  year  of office, irrespective  of the  level of output,  and  has  a cost  of
effort function  given by c[.]. Therefore,  the  politician's  utility  function  is:
UP  =  [X - c[el]  +  6[X - c[e 21] + 62X * Pr[reelection]
where  6 is the discount  rate.  Effort in the  third  period  is 0 because  the game  ends
in  that  period.  In order  to  decide  on the  optimal  levels of el and  e2, the  politicians
need  to calculate  their  effect on the  probability  of reelection.  They  know that  voters
will use  the  observations  on  y,  and  Y2  to  update  their  beliefs about  the  underlying
29ability  0.  It  follows  from  the  assumption  of normality  that  expected  ability  of the
incumbent  in the  post-election  period,  that  is after  observing  yi  and  Y2,  is given by:
m3 =  E[Ojy1, Y2] = [a  2[mI] +  oj2[y  + y2]]/[a2  + aO2]
Since there  is no way of updating  beliefs about  the opposition,  the expected  ability
of the  opposition  is given by  ml,  that  is, the  expected  value  of 0 in the  first  period.
Hence,  politicians  would  like to  manipulate  effort so that  m3 > ml, which  is satisfied
if [Yl + Y21 >1y  .mi,al,ao-],  where  -y* is a critical  value  that  depends  on in,  and  a0.
Politicians  decide  on the  optimal  levels of effort by maximizing
E[Up]  =  E[x  - c[el]  + 6x  - 6 * c[e2[Yl]]  + 6b2 * [1 -F[*]]]
where  F[.] is the  cumulative  distribution  function  of the  random  variable  [Yl +  Y2]-
If 6  is small  enough,  that  is,  the  future  is heavily  discounted,  then  there  exists  an
equilibrium  where  e* > e*, that  is, politicians  exert  greater  effort  in the  election  year.
However,  voters  are  also  equipped  to  solve the  above  optimization  problem  of
politicians  and  can,  in equilibrium,  calculate  the  optimal  effort functions  e* and  e*.
Rational  voters  decide  the  reelection  rule  based  on their  inference  about  the  politi-
cian's  choice of e* and  e2*
Upon  observing  Yi  and  Y2, voters  update  their  beliefs  about  the  expected  value
of the  incumbent's  0, but  only after  accounting  for their  belief about  the  politician's
optimal  choice of effort, et.  In equilibrium,  voters  observe:
Zt  =Yt  -e  =  0 + Et
and  reelect  the  incumbent  if and  only if E[OIzi,  z2]  > m1, where  m 1 is the  expected
value of the opposition's  ability.  As before, it follows from the assumption  of normality
that
E[Ojzj,  Z2] =  [au2[ml] +  2[  Z2]]/[U2  +  _I]
30Therefore,  voters  reelect  the incumbent  if and  only if [zl + Z2] >  7* [Ml,  o',  a.2]-
Voters  are  not  fooled,  in equilibrium,  by  the  politician's  manipulations,  but  the
latter  is trapped  into providing  greater  effort in the election  period because  not doing
so would bias the  process  of inference against  her.  There  is no Nash  equilibrium  with
politicians  exerting  no  effort.  If politicians  exert  no  effort  then  the  best  response
of voters  is to  re-elect  if [Yl +  Y2] >  imi,  o,  cr  ].  However,  then  it  is in  the  interest
of politicians  to  deviate  and  choose  e* and  e* to  maximiiize  E[Up]. The  voters'  best
response  now  is  to  re-elect  if  [z 1 + Z2] >  y*[Ml,a2,0o2].  An  appealing  feature  of the
equilibrium  is that  voters  may  not  reward  an  incumbent  for  greater  effort  in  the
election  year,  but  they  may  be more  likely to  punish  the  incumbent  if  there  is no
increase  in effort.  Hence,  voters  are able to extract  greater  effort  in the  election  year
from  incumbents  seeking re-election.
The above model  shows that  cycles can be generated  by high political  discounting
of the future,  even when there  are no information  asymmetries,  and voters are rational,
in that  they  use all available information  to make deductions  about  underlying  ability.
However, there  can be several equilibrium  strategies  of policy manipulation  depending
on the  production  technology  for y, which would determine  the extent  to which voters
can  make  inferences  about  ability  by  observing  output.  In multiple-tasks  models  of
career  concerns [Tirole, 1994], effort is exerted  in those tasks  which are relatively  more
informative  about  underlying  ability.  Therefore,  this  model  can  make  a  distinction
between  the  relative  importance  of elections  for  public  service delivery  versus  fiscal
policy.  Voters  may  have more  to  learn  from  observing  government  management  of
public  works,  while  tax  cuts  and  subsidy  spending  may  be  relatively  uninformative
about  underlying  ability.
In fact,  the  evidence for fiscal policy  manipulation  is of relatively  smaller  magni-
tude.  Moreover, the tax  breaks  are targeted  to specific groups  of producers,  and  cap-
31ital spending may be allocated selectively  to preferred construction contracts.  Both
of these fiscal effects  point in the direction of political favors extended in exchange for
campaign support.  The models of electoral competition with special interests [Gross-
man and Helpman, 1996;  Bardhan and Mookherjee, 1999]  do not lend themselves to
electoral cycles, even in a dynamic setting, because it is assumed that  contracts be-
tween politicians and organized  groups are credible and binding. In fact, in developed
economies this is a reasonable assumption given the nature of the institutional and
legal system.  However, when contracts are difficult to enforce, politicians may use
some policy instruments only in the election year to purchase the required support
for their campaign.
The career concerns  model may be particularly useful in explaining the distinction
between electoral cycles in developed and developing countries.  Firstly, in poorer
countries, there may be greater conflict and wasteful bargaining between different
interest groups, which worsens the common agency problem and leads to a higher
discount rate for politicians. Secondly,  management inefficiencies  may be particularly
rampant in public works in developing  countries, given the lower  quality of other insti-
tutional mechanisms to monitor performance, so that  even some amount of political
pressure to  improve performance may produce dramatic results, without having to
significantly  increase spending. The result of both these forces is substantial electoral
cycles in public works in developing countries, a phenomena not observed for the
developed countries.
VI.  Conclusion
This paper finds evidence  for political cycles  in public policy in the Indian states: taxes
on producers are lower, public investment spending is higher, and road construction
32by public works departments is higher in election years.  However, electoral fiscal
manipulations have no significant effect on state budget deficits, primarily because
spending on the current  account falls.  This pattern  is somewhat counter-intuitive
because it does not consist of a populist spending spree to sway poor and uneducated
voters; nor can it be explained within the framework of existing models of political
budget cycles.
A striking feature of the results is that  the effect of elections on road construc-
tion is of much greater magnitude than the effect on fiscal variables. The substantial
increases in new roads in election years, even after controlling for spending, implies
that  government management of public works improves. This is consistent with  a
moral hazard model of career concerns  where politicians exert greater effort in public
service delivery to influence  voters' inference  about their ability. The election cycle is
generated by high discounting of the future in an environment of political uncertain-
ties, so that it is only in the election year that incentives  to woo  the majority of voters
is the greatest. Further research on the effect of elections on other publicly provided
services would be valuable to test this career concerns model, since here evidence is
only presented for road construction.
The story presented in this paper accounts for the difference between political
cycles in developed and developing countries on the basis of two primary arguments:
one, in developing countries political upheavals may be more frequent, and interest
group politics more fractious, leading to higher discount rates for politicians; and two,
poor institutional monitoring of performance  in public works in developing countries
may provide considerable  room for improvement  under political pressure. It is striking
that the empirical evidence  is not consistent with the more intuitive explanation that
poor and uneducated voters in developing  countries are more myopic and hence more
susceptible to short-term political manipulation.
33Another explanation of the difference  in political cycles could arise from compar-
ing national  cycles to  sub-national cycles.  The literature  thus far has focussed on
the effect of presidential and national parliamentary elections, where it may be eas-
ier to manipulate  fiscal and  monetary policy to  affect voter perceptions.  However,
at sub-national  levels, voters may evaluate candidates on more micro indicators of
performance, and a moral hazard model of government accountability may be more
appropriate.  Further research on the contrast of election strategies and voting behav-
ior in national versus local elections would provide insights to the question of political
accountability at different levels of government.
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37Table  I
State  Government  Taxes and  Spending
Fiscal Variable  Proportion  of Total
Commodity  Taxes  88%a
Sales tax  5 0 %b
Excise tax  15 %b
Trade tax  10%b
Current  Spending  70%c
[includes subsidies  and salaries]
Development  Capital  Spending  12%c
[includes investment  spending]
a.  Proportion  of total  own  tax  revenue
b.  Proportion  of  commodity  tax  revenue
c.  Proportion  of total  spending
Table  II
Roads:  Management  and  Funding
National  Highways  State  Roads
Management  State PWDs  State PWDs
District  & Village Councils
Funding  Central  Budget  State  Budget
38Table III
Summary  Statisticsa
Variable  |Obs  Mean  Std. Dev.
Scheduled Election  513  0.16  0.36
Midterm Election  513  0.08  0.27
Political Affiliationb  513  0.39  0.49
Growth in National Highwaysc  318  19.5  98.4
Growth in State Roadsc  330  1686.3  3583.8
Commodity Taxes  456  58.1  40.4
Sales Taxes  445  28.3  21.2
Excise Taxes  456  9.3  10.8
Trade Taxes  443  6.1  6.3
Development Spending [current]  456  95.9  57.4
Non-development  Spending  456  46.3  20.8
Total Current Spending  456  144.5  76.1
Development Spending [capital]  469  23.4  11.7
State Debt  470  48.9  26.7
State Domestic Product  464  1101.6  576.7
Share of Agriculture in SDP  464  0.43  0.11
Total Populationd  513  41626  25195
Proportion  of Rural Population  483  0.79  0.08
a.  Taxes,  spending  and  SDP  variables  are  in  percapita  1973  rupees
b.  Indicator  variable  equals  1 if incumbent  is  affiliated  with  central  govt.
c.  In  kilometers
d.  In  thousands
39Table IV(a)
Effect  of Elections  on  Commodity  Taxesa
[t-statistics  in parenthesis]
[1]  [2]  [3]  [4]
Independent  Variables:
Scheduled  election year  -3.42  -3.94
[-1.37]  [-2.27]
Midterm  Election  Year  4.97  2.20
[1.73]  [0.88]
State  domestic  product  [SDP]  0.05  0.05
[8.84]  [8.76]
Share  of agriculture  in SDP  -57.18  -55.16
[-2.89]  [-2.73]
Proportion  of rural  population  -960.2  -962.8
[-10.5]  [-10.4]
Number  of Observations  456  394  456  394
R-sq  0.87  0.94  0.87  0.94
a.  All taxes and SDP are in 1973 rupees per capita.  Regressions include year  and
state  effects, and are reported with robust  standard  errors.
40Table IV(b)




1 yr before Elections  1.10  2.47
[0.32]  [1.07]
2 yrs before Elections  2.03  2.64
[0.70]  [1.28]
3 yrs before Elections  4.20  6.89
[1.35]  [2.88]
4 yrs before Elections  3.86  4.09
[1.24]  [1.83]
State domestic product [SDP]  0.05
[8.82]
Share of agriculture in SDP  -60.86
[-3.22]
Proportion of rural population  -948.0
[-10.4]
Number of Observations  456  394
R-sq  0.87  0.94
a. All  taxes  and  SDP  are  in  1973 rupees  per  capita.
Regressions  include  year  and  state  effects,  and  are  reported
with  robust  standard  errors.
41Table IV(c)
Comparing Election Effects on Sales vs Producer Taxesa
[t-statistics in parenthesis]
Sales Tax  Trade Tax  Excise Tax
Independent Variables:
Scheduled  election year  -1.31  -1.08  -1.40
[-0.99]  [-2.20]  [-2.29]
State domestic product [SDP]  0.01  0.01  0.02
[3.31]  [6.79]  [7.04]
Share of agriculture in SDP  -33.77  -4.18  -25.38
[-2.87]  [-1.59]  [-2.65]
Proportion of rural population  -362.57  -81.72  -215.62
[-5.27]  [-2.70]  [-6.99]
Number of Observations  383  381  394
R-sq  0.89  0.80  0.89
a.  All taxes and SDP are in 1973 rupees per capita.  Regressions include year and
state  effects, and are reported with robust standard  errors.
42Table V(a)
Effect of Elections on Capital Spendinga
it-statistics in parenthesis]
[1]  [2]  [3]  [4]
Independent Variables:
Scheduled election year  2.45  2.54
[1.58]  [1.63]
Midterm election year  -2.47  -2.68
[-1.96]  [-2.07]
State domestic product [SDP]  0.001  0.002
[0.41]  10.44]
Share of agriculture in SDP  5.91  3.79
[0.65]  [0.44]
Proportion of rural population  -98.29  -100.39
[-2.05]  [-2.08]
Number of Observations  469  407  469  407
R-sq  0.64  0.66  0.64  0.66
a.  Capital  outlays  and  SDP  are  in  1973  rupees  per  capita.  Regressions  include
state  and  year  effects,  and  are  reported  with  robust  standard  errors.
43Table  V(b)
Effect  of Elections  on  Capital  Spendinga
[t-statistics  in parenthesis]
[1]  [2]
Independent  Variables:
1 yr before Elections  -0.71  -1.30
[-0.36]  [-0.70]
2 yrs before Elections  -1.33  -1.75
[-0.78]  [-1.02]
3 yrs  before Elections  -2.43  -3.00
[-1.40]  [-1.66]
4 yrs before Elections  -3.58  -4.07
[-1.87]  [-2.12]
State  domestic  product  [SDP]  0.002
[0.51]
Share  of agriculture  in  SDP  8.34
[0.90]
Proportion  of rural  population  -103.58
[-2.12]
Number  of Observations  469  407
R-sq  0.65  0.66
a.  Capital  outlays  and  SDP  are  in  1973 rupees  per  capita.  Include
state  and  year  effects,  and  reported  with  robust  std.  errors.
44Table V(c)
Effect of Elections on Current Spendinga
[t-statistics in parenthesis]
[1]  [2]  [3]  [4]
Independent Variables:
Scheduled election year  -3.72  -5.12
[-1.27]  [-1.92]
Midterm Election Year  12.66  10.76
[1.87]  [1.95]
State domestic product [SDP]  0.08  0.08
[5.41]  [5.71]
Share of agriculture in SDP  -69.91  -62.03
[-2.33]  [-1.86]
Proportion of rural population  -444.58  -431.25
[-2.79]  [-2.70]
Number of Observations  456  394  456  394
R-sq  0.93  0.95  0.93  0.95
a. Current  spending  and  SDP  are  in  1973 rupees  per  capita.  Regressions
include  state  and  year  effects,  and  are  reported  with  robust  standard  errors.
45Table VI
Effect of Elections on State Debta
[t-statistics in parenthesis]
z  [1]  [2]
Independent Variables:
Scheduled election year  3.59  2.88
[1.03]  [0.93]
State domestic product [SDP]  0.06
[7.43]
Share of agriculture in SDP  -20.35
[-1.35]
Proportion of rural population  116.79
[0.82]
Number of Observations  470  408
R-sq  0.63  0.73
a.  State  debt and SDP are in 1973 rupees  per capita.  Regressions
include state  and year effects, and are reported with robust
standard  errors.
46Table VII
Effect of Elections on Road Constructiona
It-statistics in parenthesis]
National Highways  State  Roads
Independent  Variablesb:  [1]  [2]  [3]  [4]  [5]
Election year  47.06  61.48
[2.22]  [2.21]
1 yr before Elections  -297.3  -196.4  -314.2
[-0.33]  [-0.19]  [-0.22]
2 yrs before Elections  -1275.2  -1400.4  -1249.1
[-1.60]  [-1.52]  [-0.98]
3 yrs before Elections  -239.4  -150.7  -237
[-0.30]  [-0.16]  [-0.19]
4 yrs before Elections  -1887.8  -1983.6  -2220.3
[-2.34]  [-2.12]  [-1.70]
Spending on Roads  0.2
[0.72]
State domestic product  [SDP]  0.02  0.7
[0.30]  [0.32]
Share of agriculture in SDP  -170.34  -5613.9
[-1.05]  [-1.27]
Proportion  of rural population  115.67  -36047.9
[0.10]  [-1.02]
Number of Observations  318  243  330  308  172
R-sq  0.1611  0.1850  0.2088  0.2328  0.2195
a. State domestic  product is in 1973  rupees per capita. Roads lengths  are in kilometers.
47Table  VII(a)
Effect of Political  Affiliation on National  Highwaysa
1 yr before Elections*  Affiliated  -40.36
[-1.30]
2 yrs before Elections*Affiliated  -79.92
[-2.60]
3 yrs before Elections*Affiliated  -33.95
[-1.15]
4 yrs before Elections*Affiliated  -47.88
[-1.41]
1 yr before Elections*  Non-affil.  -5.26
[-0.15]
2 yrs before Elections*  Non-affil.  -29.93
[-0.81]
3 yrs before Elections*  Non-affil.  -14.58
[-0.40]
4 yrs before Elections*  Non-affil.  -33.63
[-1.00]
Political  Affiliationb  -28.90
[-0.90]
Number  of Observations  318
R-sq  0.1715
a. Regression  includes  state  and  year  effects.
b.  Indicator  equals  1 if the  incumbent  is  affiliated  with  the  centre.
48Table VIII
State Roads in Big and Small Statesa
[t-statistics in parenthesis]
[1]  [2]  l
Independent Variables:
Election Year*Big  1637.02  1825.07
[1.861  [1.93]
Election Year*Small  30.00  233.79
[0.04]  [0.261
State domestic product [SDP]  1.01
[0.46]
Share of agriculture in SDP  -5567.94
[-1.26]
Proportion of rural population  -34203.37
[-0.97]
Number of Observations  330  308
R-sq  0.2002  0.2254
a.  Big=1 for the 5 largest states, and Small=1 for the 9 smaller states.
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